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Abstract:  A vertically integrated firm that wholesales to its retail rivals can, if it has 
sufficient market power, set the margin between its retail and wholesale prices so as to 
harm its rivals. Conventionally, an imputation test is used to determine whether such 
behavior is being undertaken. Such tests are common in electronic communications, and 
the EC calls for their potentially intensive ex ante application in the supply of NGANs. This 
paper shows that while imputation tests are helpful analytical tools for understanding the 
nature of price squeezes, difficulties associated with implementation, which are sharp in 
an NGAN context, can make them misleading in practice. Instead, price squeezes are 
best dealt with through the rigorous comparison of expected outcomes, given the alleged 
anticompetitive behavior, with the outcomes expected in that behavior's absence. Such 
analysis is not suited to ex ante application. 
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   Vertical integration, price squeezes  
and imputation tests 
A next generation access network (NGAN) is a necessary input in the 
supply of high-speed broadband services. NGAN suppliers typically self-
supply the NGAN input at the wholesale layer, and retail to purchasers who 
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do not supply electronic communications (hereafter "end-users"), so are 
vertically integrated.  
Vertical integration is ubiquitous. All firms are, to some extent or another, 
vertically integrated. Moreover, vertical integration is usually efficient, arising 
when vertically coordinated actions are more productive than exchanging 
goods and services through arm's length (or horizontal) market-based 
transactions. Indeed, the empirical record suggests that even where antitrust 
concerns have been raised, commercial agreements to vertically integrate 
are commonly beneficial (LAFONTAINE & SLADE, 2007). Some vertically 
integrated NGAN suppliers can or will be able to act to a significant extent 
independently of actual or potential rivals, and hence can expect profits that 
more than recover the efficiently incurred costs of their operations. Such 
firms are said to have substantial (or in the EU, significant) market power 
(SMP) 1.   
Vertically integrated electronic communications carriers with SMP are 
often required to wholesale services to carriers who have not made access 
network investments (hereafter "unintegrated carriers"). For example, 
regulated unbundling of copper loop deployed by incumbents with SMP is 
common, while a draft European Commission (EC) recommendation calls for 
mandated wholesaling of SMP carriers' NGANs 2.  
The capacity of unintegrated firms to effectively compete with 
wholesaling vertically integrated suppliers in part depends on whether 
unintegrated competition is efficient. Despite the almost certain presence of 
substantial vertical economies of scope in NGAN provision, unintegrated 
provision may still be efficient. For example, some unintegrated firms may be 
excellent niche marketers, reaching customers at lower costs than those that 
the NGAN provider would have to incur. 
                       
1 A firm without market power can only make sales at the market price, which is beyond its 
capacity to influence (that is, the market price would not be changed if the firm withdrew from 
the market or maximized its output). In contrast, a firm with market power can make sales at a 
range of prices, but chooses the price that maximizes its profit. In practice, many firms have 
market power, for example, because of product differentiation, but still operate in effectively 
competitive environments (that is, their competitors' responses constrain them to recover, in 
expectation, their efficiently incurred costs). 
2 Draft Commission Recommendation on regulated access to Next Generation Access 
Networks (NGA), 12 June 2009. 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/doc/library/public_consult/nga_2/090611_
nga_recommendation_spc.pdf (hereafter "the draft EC recommendation"). H. ERGAS, E. KODJO RALPH & E. LANIGAN  69 
If the vertically integrated firm has wholesale SMP, then it might be able 
to and wish to harm an efficient unintegrated carrier when it buys the 
vertically integrated firm's input. (Without SMP, any anticompetitive action 
would be defeated by competitive responses, for example, wholesale supply 
from another firm.) One means of harming rivals would be to set a margin 
between the vertically integrated firm's retail and wholesale prices that it is 
too small for even efficient, but unintegrated, rivals to recover their costs. 
This practice is known as a price or margin squeeze. 
This paper is concerned with how one might detect a price squeeze. In 
what follows: The 2
nd Section shows that the conditions that must hold for a 
price squeeze are rigorous. When wholesale prices are set by regulation, 
objecting to a price squeeze is a call for higher retail prices. Given that, and 
the difficulty of effecting a squeeze, prosecution should only occur against a 
high burden of proof. The 3
rd Section illustrates, in a highly simplified 
environment, a means of detecting a price squeeze - imputation testing. The 
4
th Section shows that in reality imputation tests are complex to implement. If 
such tests are to be meaningful, then they must be applied over the arena in 
which firms compete, and should provide a coherent comparison of the 
expected outcomes under the squeeze and in its absence. Further, such 
analysis requires sophisticated modeling and sensitivity testing and so is 
likely to be meaningless if undertaken rapidly or following a rote process. 
Yet, in many jurisdictions, regulation of electronic communications calls for 
frequent imputation testing. The Section after demonstrates that in realistic 
settings, like those for NGANs, imputation testing is also not conceptually 
simple, but rather a choice must be made among divergent tests, each of 
which does not clearly identify whether anticompetitive harm is being 
effected. Accordingly, careful analysis of the case with and without the 
alleged behavior is the best way to identify whether prices embody a 
squeeze. The last Section concludes. 
   The mechanics of a price squeeze  
A simple illustration of the basic mechanics of a price squeeze can be 
provided by assuming that: 
-  all retail output is identical across the competing firms and the market 
is contestable (so all active retail firms have set the equal lowest price, 
and a sale by one firm displaces an identical sale by another);  70     No. 78, 2
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-  the per unit retail and wholesale prices do not vary with volumes 
purchased; 
-  the vertically integrated firm supplies a wholesale input that must be 
used to supply retail output (that is, no bypass substitution), and must be 
used in fixed proportions with the retail output (that is, no substitution by 
buying less of the input and augmenting it, for example, as one might do 
with broadband by purchasing a lower broadband speed wholesale, and 
using data compression to supply the customer with what appears to be 
a faster link than its physical specifications);  
-  the unit costs of producing wholesale and retail inputs do not change 
with volumes (constant returns-to-scale); 
-  the actions of suppliers do not change the size of the retail market by 
shifting consumer demands; and  
-  the relevant markets are not "two-way" or "two-sided" (as will be 
explained below). 
Under these assumptions, a price squeeze occurs if the vertically 
integrated firm's retail prices are not sufficient to recover the price of the 
wholesaled input plus the efficient costs of combining the wholesale input 
with other inputs and producing the competing retail output (that is, the retail 
transformation costs). Thus, there is a price squeeze if the retail price, P, is 
less than the sum of the wholesale price, W, and the efficient transformation 
costs of going from wholesale to retail supply, C, that is, if P<W+C. The 
effect presumably would drive even efficient unintegrated carriers from the 
market. 
At the risk of stating the obvious, it must be the case that the firm 
engaging in the squeeze has sufficient market power over a wholesale input 
to harm existing and potential competition (otherwise unintegrated firms 
would simply purchase the input from a different firm). 
While a price squeeze makes unintegrated supply unprofitable, it also 
reduces the profits of the squeezing firm by W-P+C. To see this, let c 
represent the per unit wholesale costs of the integrated firm. Thus, a 
squeezing firm has chosen to earn P-C-c on every retail sale it makes, when 
it could earn W-c on every unit wholesaled. The difference between profit on 
retailing and wholesaling is therefore P-C-W. But, if there is price squeeze, 
then P<W+C, which implies P-C-W<0.  H. ERGAS, E. KODJO RALPH & E. LANIGAN  71 
Accordingly, if a price squeeze is to be a plausible anticompetitive 
strategy, then, as with predatory pricing, the squeezing firm must eventually 
expect to more than recover the revenues foregone during the squeeze 3.  
This is so, even if during the squeeze, the vertically integrated firm makes 
positive profits - that is, if P-C-c>0 - because the firm could have made even 
greater returns if it had not engaged in the squeeze. Moreover, if the profits 
lost during the squeeze are to be recovered, then the profits made during the 
later recoupment phase must be substantially greater than the nominal loss 
so as to compensate for the time-cost of money, the risks that something 
might change thereby preventing recoupment, and the risk of antitrust 
proceedings and penalties. Consequently, after competition has been 
harmed, there must be sufficient barriers to retail entry or service 
(re)expansion, that the vertically integrated firm can raise prices for a 
sufficiently long period to recoup the revenues given up during the squeeze. 
Recoupment means a successful squeeze must harm end-users: any 
end-user gains during the squeeze (when P<W+C) are more than lost in the 
profit recovery phase. However, it also means that if the recoupment of profit 
foregone during an alleged price squeeze is not possible, then it is unlikely a 
price squeeze has occurred (CROCIONI & VELJANOVSKI, 2003). Rather, 
the observed behavior, which after all amounts to setting lower prices, is just 
like any other competitive action, necessarily harming rivals and benefiting 
end-users.  
Since an anticompetitive price squeeze is only profitable in unlikely 
circumstances, and is difficult to distinguish from pro-competitive behavior, 
banning squeezes raises the real probability that legitimate behavior will be 
mistakenly punished, chilling competition. For example, rather than risk 
being accused of a squeeze, a supplier of an input may over-price its retail 
outputs, or simply refuse to produce the input where there is no duty to 
supply (CARLTON, 2008). Consequently, any prohibitions on price 
squeezes should be subject to strict conditions of proof, so as to avoid the 
possibly high social costs of "false positives". This leads to the question of 
how to detect price squeezes. 
                       
3 Non-price vertical discrimination also harms rivals, but potentially at little direct cost to the 
vertically integrated firm. Consequently, one would expect such activity in conjunction with a 
squeeze, or an explanation for its absence. 72     No. 78, 2
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   Detecting price squeezes:  
imputation tests in the simple case 
Price squeezes are typically identified through imputation tests. A simple 
example was already implicitly provided above: check whether P≥W+C. The 
imputation test is passed, that is, finds no price squeeze, if P≥W+C.  
In applying such a test, the vertically integrated firm's transformation cost 
is often used as an estimate of C. This has the advantage that the vertically 
integrated firm does not have to guess what efficient transformation costs 
are when setting prices, but can instead rely on its own cost information. 
Moreover, if the vertically integrated firm incurs unduly high transformation 
costs,  C, then an efficient rival will undercut it, forcing the vertically 
integrated firm to reduce its costs or lose its market share. 
Under the assumptions of the previous section, an imputation test is not 
only simple to express, but is, as the rest of this section explains, 
conceptually compelling. In that case, passage of the simple imputation test, 
P≥W+C, demonstrates three separate facts: 
•  Unintegrated firms can profitably replicate the vertically integrated 
firm's prices: that is, the margin between the vertically integrated firm's 
wholesale and retail prices, P-W, is sufficient to allow an efficient 
unintegrated supplier to cover its costs of transforming the wholesale service 
and other inputs into the retail output, C. This is the 'replication' interpretation 
of the test. 
•  The vertically integrated firm is properly accounting for the opportunity 
cost of wholesale revenues. As discussed, a price squeeze is costly to the 
squeezing firm, since it foregoes more revenues upstream than it gains 
downstream. Hence, a squeezing firm is behaving as if the opportunity cost 
of wholesaling does not matter. Passage of the test shows its prices are 
consistent with recognition of this opportunity cost. This is 'opportunity cost' 
interpretation of the test. 
• The vertically integrated firm's behavior is, on its face, profit 
maximizing. In the simple case under examination, this is so exactly 
because the vertically integrated firm accounts for the opportunity costs of 
wholesaling, so the second and third understandings are essentially 
identical. This is the 'profit maximization' interpretation of the test. Failing this 
test suggests that the firm might have an anticompetitive purpose that 
makes the behavior profit maximizing. Thus, this aspect of the test is closely 
linked to the 'but for' test often used in competition law. That test asks H. ERGAS, E. KODJO RALPH & E. LANIGAN  73 
whether the firm would have engaged in the behavior 'but for' having an 
anticompetitive intent. In short, in the simple case of the previous section, 
passing the imputation test suggests efficient rivals can profitably compete 
with the vertically integrated firm, and the vertically integrated firm is 
behaving as any competitive profit-maximizing firm would. Conversely, 
failure of the test suggests that competition would be harmed and that the 
vertically integrated firm may well be behaving anticompetitively. 
   Implementation complexity and its implications 
In practice, imputation testing is more complex than the simple test 
outlined above. This section considers examples of this complexity as it 
arises in the cases of bundling and other forms of joint supply (for example, 
offering separate telephony and broadband services over the same 
infrastructure), contracts with different time commitments, 'teaser-rates' and 
loss leaders, nonlinear pricing, and economies of scale.  
Each of the discussed examples is highly simplified, but the required 
analysis is not. In particular, the examples show that to demonstrate a price 
squeeze requires identifying (1) the arena over which firms compete 4, (2) 
the outcomes that can be expected given the squeeze must be elucidated, 
that is, the factual must be identified (this is like estimating P-C-c, but also 
would show how the squeezing firm is able to behave after the squeeze 
phase is over), and (3) the outcome that would be expected given 
competitive behavior, that is, a counterfactual must also be demonstrated 
(this is like estimating W-c). Comparing the factual with the counterfactual 
amounts to a complex form of an imputation test. To find a squeeze, the 
comparison must demonstrate that the factual, because it prevents efficient 
competition, is more harmful to consumers and more profitable to the 
squeezing firm. 
Such analysis is necessarily time-consuming and expensive. It cannot 
practically be undertaken, for example, for routine tariff filings or changes in 
circumstances, and produce meaningful results. Yet, in the regulation of 
electronic communications casual imputation testing is surprisingly common. 
                       
4 This arena will generally be the market, or a segment of the market that is crucial for 
sustained competition. In all cases, the test should use the retail costs incremental to supplying 
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Bundling and joint supply 
A vertically integrated firm might offer a special discount on telephony 
service if the customer also buys other services from them. In electronic 
communications, bundling is common as it typically lowers costs (that is, 
provides economies of scope) in both provision and consumption. To 
provide a simple example, consider a telephony and broadband bundle. 
Applying an imputation test to the telephony service alone 5 might show a 
price squeeze (as might a test that focuses on the broadband price), but 
since the broadband and telephony services must be bought together, this 
may be misleading. If an efficient unintegrated firm can purchase a 
wholesale service, say unbundled local loop, and profitably supply both 
telephony and broadband at the vertically integrated firm's combined retail 
prices for these services, then there is no squeeze. Here, then, the arena of 
supply must include both telephony and broadband. 
Bundling alone does not capture the fullness of competition in many 
markets, notably those for electronic communication. For example, it may 
cost less to produce two or more services jointly even when not bundled. If 
so, commercial reality may dictate that efficient carriers sell the full range of 
services that deliver those economies. However, this can lead to prices that 
would fail an inappropriately narrow imputation test.  
In electronic communications, incremental costs tend to fall as the 
number of services provided and service volumes rise. Consequently, 
incremental cost pricing typically does not allow recovery of total costs.  
Allowing different markups above cost can maximize end-users benefits 
while still ensuring overall cost recovery. Thus, the market might deliver 
certain services at rates that just cover their incremental costs, and other 
services at rates that more than do so. While such a pricing strategy may be 
efficient, an imputation test narrowly applied to the lower priced services 
may fail, suggesting a squeeze. Yet, this is likely to be incorrect. An 
appropriate imputation test would identify the services over which costs are 
efficiently shared and determine whether an efficient competitor purchasing 
the necessary wholesale inputs to supply the efficient aggregation of 
services faces a price squeeze. It may be that when the returns from 
supplying an efficient service range are considered, there is no squeeze. 
                       
5 For example, the prices might be listed, but only available if the bundle is purchased. 
Alternatively, if there is only a single bundle price, then an implied price of telephony might be 
obtained by subtracting the market rate for standalone broadband service from the bundle price. H. ERGAS, E. KODJO RALPH & E. LANIGAN  75 
Explicit and implicit time commitments 
Long-term contracts (and also bundling) are likely to allow risk sharing. 
Suppliers with large sunk costs may grant wholesale purchasers and end-
users discounts and price certainty in return for gaining commitments to 
broad and ongoing use, thereby reducing the risks sunk investments 
necessitate. 
As an example, a vertically integrated firm might offer a special discount 
on telephony for the first year of service, but a two-year contract is required. 
While the initial discounted price might fail an imputation test, this need not 
indicate a squeeze. What is relevant is whether an efficient unintegrated firm 
could profitably make a similar retail offer. That is, the correct retail price in 
the imputation test is the full price of the contract. Equally, if unintegrated 
firms can get wholesale discounts if they commit to a two-year contract, then 
the two-year wholesale price should be used in the imputation test. Further, 
contract lengths may not be the only relevant determinant of the appropriate 
timeframe for an imputation test. For example, the time-profile of customers' 
stays with an efficient carrier is also likely to be relevant.  
Loss-leaders 
A vertically integrated firm may introduce a new, say, extremely high 
speed broadband service at temporarily low rates as a means of attracting 
attention to the service and allowing users to discover its true value. 
Similarly, a vertically integrated firm may offer a low priced low bandwidth 
service knowing a significant number of purchasers will learn the value of the 
service, but upgrade as they become frustrated with the service's limitations. 
Both approaches amount to loss leading and are likely to be particularly 
important in the context of NGANs. Many new services are likely to be 
available on an NGAN and these may be difficult for potential end-users to 
value without trying them, but, having not tried the service, end-users may 
not be willing to pay their full cost. Such goods are referred to as experience 
goods, and suppliers often seek to kick-start consumption of such goods 
through the use of loss leaders and teaser rates.  
In both cases, an imputation test might fail if it was narrowly applied to 
the temporary rate or "teaser" offering. However, if cost-based prices (that is, 
prices consistent with a narrowly defined imputation test) were required, then 
innovative services might never take-off. Further, an efficient unintegrated 76     No. 78, 2
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carrier might be able to profitably replicate the vertically integrated firm's 
strategies. For example, this would be so if initial losses on the temporary 
sales are made up by profits on later higher priced sales, and if losses on 
the teaser service are recovered as customers move from the low to higher 
bandwidth and so from the low to higher priced packages. Thus, the narrow 
imputation test would be misleading. An appropriate imputation test would 
look at the true arena of competition and account for demand shifts over 
time and across service offerings. 
Nonlinear prices and economies of scale 
Nonlinear pricing is not merely ubiquitous in electronic communications 
retailing, but is likely necessary for efficient cost-recovery (for the reasons 
given above). Efficiency likely also requires nonlinear wholesale rates 
(KENNET & RALPH, 2007), though these are often regulated to be linear. In 
either case, the P or W of the simple imputation test are not well-defined 
unless a volume of sales is also specified. Accordingly, to make statements 
about profitability and whether account of opportunity costs is taken, it is not 
enough to identify the arena of competition. The volume of firms' sales and 
purchases must be estimated. In particular, outcomes in the case of the 
alleged squeeze (the factual) and outcomes in its absence (the 
counterfactual) must be specified, with the comparison of the two 
determining how the vertically integrated firm's actions in the factual could 
be said to maximize profits, and whether competition was harmed. It goes 
without saying that the outcome of such comparisons will be sensitive to the 
underlying assumptions. 
A similar effect occurs when the unit costs of supplying retail services 
(beyond those of the wholesale input, if it is priced linearly) vary with output 
levels, meaning c and C are also not defined until output volumes are 
specified.  
An example of regulatory error in this respect is AGCOM's requirement 
(Resolution 152/02/CONS Annex E) that the regulatory accounts, which 
contain average costs, be used in conducting imputation tests. This forces 
Telecom Italia's prices, if they are to pass an imputation test, to exceed 
average costs, regardless of the specific costs of supply in any given case. 
In some market segments, this prevented Telecom Italia from competing, 
since its rivals were already pricing below average costs. H. ERGAS, E. KODJO RALPH & E. LANIGAN  77 
The implications of imputation testing complexity 
These simple examples illustrate that, to be appropriate, an imputation 
test must cover the arena of competition that a squeeze is said to hamper. 
An imputation test on a narrow service, such as calls on weekends, given 
competition occurs more broadly than that, at best provides limited and 
inconclusive information on the impact on competition. This is particularly the 
case if that service is not sold separately, or if no viable business model can 
be based on only selling that service separately. Rather, firms compete in 
markets, which in turn have many dimensions (such as product, geographic, 
customer, vertical position, and time). If a squeeze is alleged, it must be 
capable of preventing an efficient, but unintegrated, firm from competing in 
some market or markets. 
When nonlinearities enter the analysis, the imputation test's results will 
vary depending on what volumes of supply are assumed. To determine the 
correct volumes amounts to showing how the vertically integrated firm's 
prices prevent an unintegrated rival from profitably engaging in efficient 
supply over an identified arena of competition. That requires demonstration 
of the outcomes under the squeeze (the factual), and how that compares 
with the case that would have been obtained if the alleged squeeze had not 
been undertaken (the counterfactual). 
Developing a robust factual and counterfactual requires much time and 
expense, and all the more so because the counterfactual is necessarily 
speculative (as the factual also must be if the squeeze is examined prior to 
final recoupment). A pertinent example occurs when unintegrated firms enter 
a market. Many retailing costs in the supply of electronic communications to 
mass-market customers are fixed (as is common in virtually any mass 
market). This means that at sufficiently low sales volumes, unit costs are 
high. Yet, entry inevitably initially occurs with low volumes, even (or 
especially) in highly competitive markets. Consequently, in the early phases 
of entry, a new firm incurs losses. As these losses are normal, it would be 
inappropriate to estimate unit retail costs, C, in the imputation test on the 
basis of initial volumes. Rather, C should be based on an estimate of the 
expected market share an efficient carrier would achieve. But determining 
what that share should be is likely to be analytically and empirically 
demanding as the following dispute about the factual and counterfactual 
hopefully makes clear: 
Consider a situation in which unintegrated entry occurs, and the 
vertically integrated firm responds by cutting its retail prices sharply. 
The entrant claims this effects a squeeze - given the incumbent's 78     No. 78, 2
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prices, the entrant believes its market share will stabilize at an 
unprofitable level (the factual; in the entrant's counterfactual, the 
incumbent's retail price cuts are more muted). The incumbent 
responds that in the factual an efficient entrant would achieve a higher 
market share and turn profitable in four years (so there is no squeeze). 
The entrant says, in the factual, it will be out of business by then, and 
the incumbent will simply raise prices back to where they were. The 
incumbent says it is not required to set prices at any minimum level 
should the entrant go out of business, and it is not its problem if the 
entrant is inefficient and goes out of business, but in any case, it does 
not believe that the entrant will fail, merely that the entrant is trying to 
get a court enforced leg-up at the incumbent's expense. 
Such an argument cannot be settled by pointing to imputation test 
results. One result based on low volume shows a squeeze, the other based 
on higher volumes says there is none. Instead, the actual claims about the 
factual and counterfactual must be carefully analyzed to come to a 
judgment. 
A key implication of all the preceding is that determining what the arena 
of competition is, and then developing a factual and counterfactual, cannot 
be done well quickly. Not surprisingly then, in most industries, imputation 
tests are applied under competition law proceedings, and hence are 
infrequent, and when applied, they are thoroughly tested in a legal setting. 
This is as it should be: when it is difficult to assess whether a certain 
behavior has occurred it is better to discourage the behavior with high fines 
on discovery, rather than substantial effort attempting to discover the 
behavior (STIGLER, 1970). 
Despite this, in electronic communications, where imputation tests are 
likely to be anything but simple, many jurisdictions impose imputation tests 
through regulatory proceedings. Indeed, imputation tests applied 
prospectively to tariffs before they are implemented can become routine, as 
has long been the case in Australia and Italy. Such regulation would likely be 
even more damaging if applied to NGANs, for at least two reasons: 
• NGANs allow quality-of-service variation, which in turn allow 
substantial product differentiation not available under traditional telephony 
and broadband supply, hence imputation testing will be considerably more 
complex in this environment than in traditional telephony. On a traditional 
copper network voice services, including services like call-forwarding, 
answering services and similar, are hard to differentiate (though customer 
service and similar can and often is differentiated). Somewhat more 
differentiation is possible through broadband service on an all-copper H. ERGAS, E. KODJO RALPH & E. LANIGAN  79 
network, largely by means of bandwidth availability and download caps, but 
these amount to vertical more than horizontal quality differences  6. 
Consequently, different carriers typically offer very similar variations in 
service, implying homogeneity of overall offerings, but in any case, the 
product differentiation is relatively limited. In contrast, on an NGAN, quality-
of-service control makes substantial horizontal product differentiation 
possible. 
•  A wide range of new services and applications are likely to be 
supplied on NGANs, in part due to quality-of-service controls, making it 
difficult for regulators (and indeed the market) to forecast outcomes. This 
makes conducting imputation tests considerably more difficult than in a more 
well understood environment, raising the likelihood and the cost of error 
(costs increase, for example, because intervention is more likely to distort or 
prevent market-oriented solutions to problems that otherwise would arise). 
Given this, it is of concern that the draft EC recommendation directs 
(paragraphs 25 and 39) that if wholesale NGAN prices are not required to be 
cost-based, then national regulatory authorities (NRAs), "at the request of an 
operator enjoying rights of access or on their own initiative, should verify the 
SMP operator's pricing behavior by applying a properly specified margin-
squeeze test". This seems like a recipe for frequent, and hence likely poor 
quality, tests. Frequent testing can be expected to arise because the cost to 
unintegrated firms of obtaining an imputation test is low (a request just need 
be made), while the benefits to unintegrated firms are likely to be material. 
The benefits to unintegrated firms of imputation testing include two that are 
efficiency enhancing: deterring squeezes; and catching and preventing 
squeezes early, even if only accidentally. The other benefits to the 
unintegrated consumer are harmful to efficiency: delaying the vertically 
integrated firm's competitive responses; discouraging competitive retail price 
responses from vertically integrated firm; and raising the integrated carrier's 
costs (because such regulatory proceedings are time, data and attention-
consuming exercise). To these costs must be added the regulator's costs 
and the costs, already discussed, of finding there is a squeeze when there is 
none. 
                       
6 When all customers agree that one service is better than another (5 versus 2 Mb/s 
broadband), then the difference is vertical; when customers have different preferences for 
different services (higher bandwidth fixed versus lower bandwidth mobile broadband) the 
difference is horizontal. 80     No. 78, 2
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In sum, routine and rapid imputation testing of prospective tariffs in real 
world environments is likely to lead to frequent regulatory errors, a 
conclusion which applies a fortiori to NGAN services. 
   In practice, the imputation test  
is not conceptually simple 
The 2
nd and 3
rd sections above suggest that, at least conceptually, the 
imputation test - P≥W+C - is simple (even if the 4
th section shows that 
implementation is complex). This conceptual simplicity is misleading, being a 
result of the restrictive assumptions of the 2
nd section. As these assumptions 
are relaxed, the simple imputation test becomes much less useful 7. Indeed, 
relative to the opportunity cost, replication and profit-maximizing 
interpretations of the test, the simple test may give both false positives and 
false negatives, even when there are no errors in empirical measurement. Of 
greater concern, these three interpretations are typically no longer 
congruent, raising the question as to whether it makes more sense to 
directly ask whether the behavior of concern harms competition and 
ultimately consumers (as compared with a counterfactual). That being said, 
(1) arguably, the opportunity cost test could be applied without undertaking a 
full analysis of the factual, so would be less costly than undertaking either 
the replication or the profit-maximizing test (each of these essentially would 
require full analysis of the factual); and (2) since passage of the opportunity 
cost test is not as rigorous as passing the profit-maximization test, this would 
also help prevent false positives, especially if coupled with a requirement 
that the material likelihood of more efficient outcomes be demonstrated in 
the counterfactual. The rest of this section discusses relaxing some of 
2
nd section's assumptions, and in so doing also explains these points.  
Retail contestability 
The assumption of retail contestability is highly simplifying. It ensures that 
all firms act, in the retail market, as price takers, so strategic interactions are 
ruled out. A somewhat weaker assumption commonly employed in the 
                       
7 There is a close analytical relationship between the imputation test and the efficient 
component pricing rule. Analysis of that rule in Armstrong, Doyle and Vickers (1996) illuminates 
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academic literature is that unintegrated firms behave as if they cannot affect 
the vertically integrated firm's prices (such firms are called a competitive 
fringe). However, even the assumption of one NGAN provider and price-
taking unintegrated firms is likely to be inappropriate (due to NGAN 
competition and bypass - see discussion below). Rather some form of 
oligopolistic competition, both upstream and downstream is likely, and this 
implies most firms are not price takers. 
In an oligopoly setting, a price squeeze cannot be assessed without 
specifying the nature of the strategic interaction between firms. However, (1) 
the analytics of allowing for such interactions are complex, and consequently 
such analysis is not commonly undertaken (ARMSTRONG, DOYLE & 
VICKERS, 1996, p. 136), and (2) basic empirical questions about how firms 
actually compete are difficult to answer even when considering past 
behavior, but are all the more so for prospective questions. As a result, it 
may be practically impossible to develop a robust description of firm 
behavior, but such a model is required if the competitive implications of 
wholesale/retail price relativities are to be assessed. 
Retail product homogeneity 
When retail product differentiation occurs, replicability can no longer be 
determined by a focus on the vertically integrated firm. With retail product 
homogeneity, the imputation test is passed so long as P=W+C (the equality 
is necessary if the vertically integrated firm is active). If the vertically 
integrated firm lowers P, even by a little, unintegrated firms would incur 
losses and so such prices could force their exit. With product differentiation, 
the vertically integrated firm's retail price, Pv, and its transformation costs, 
Cv, have to be distinguished from those of unintegrated firms, and it no 
longer follows that if Pv<W+Cv, then unintegrated firms necessarily make a 
loss. 
To see this, consider first the case where Pv=W+Cv. With product 
differentiation, each unintegrated firm faces its own downward sloping 
demand. As a consequence, if the vertically integrated firm marginally lowers 
its price, then some or even all of those firms may still earn nonnegative 
profits, though competitive pressure may force them to lower prices and/or 
output volumes. In contrast, in the homogenous product case, any active 
unintegrated firms necessarily earn zero profits if P=W+C, and at lower 82     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
prices must exit or face losses. (Table 1 below summarizes this and the 
following results.) Thus, Pv<W+Cv does not necessarily violate replicability. 
Similarly,  Pv≥W+Cv does not demonstrate that any or all efficient 
unintegrated firms can profitably supply retail services. Thus, for example, 
because retail differentiation may involve fixed costs, it is possible for all 
firms to earn zero profits when the vertically integrated firm sets Pv so as to 
maximize its profits. Moreover, this may result in optimal product 
differentiation. However, if the vertically integrated firm were to lower Pv to 
slightly below the profit-maximizing price, so that Pv still exceeded W+Cv, 
then this would (by definition) not be the profit-maximizing price, yet by 
assumption, this could render efficient unintegrated supply unprofitable. 
Thus, replicability (in the sense of prices that allow efficient unintegrated 
supply) is not guaranteed even if Pv≥W+Cv 8. Without an accurate and 
necessarily complex model of how firms interact, it may be impossible to 
distinguish a situation with anticompetitive impacts from one with none at all 
(and such a model may be impossible to produce). 
The test, Pv≥W+Cv, may also no longer be a good indicator of opportunity 
cost recovery. This is because, as before, for every retail sale, the vertically 
integrated firm makes unit profits, P-Cv-c, but product differentiation means 
that, in claiming a retail sale, the vertically integrated firm only loses some 
fraction, call it σ<1, of a unit in wholesale volumes (-σ is sometimes called 
the diversion ratio). If there is a difference between W and c, contrary to the 
simple case, this leads to a wedge being driven between retailing and 
wholesaling contributions. The opportunity cost of a retail sale is σ(W-c), 
which implies the opportunity cost test requires that Pv≥c(1-σ) + σW+Cv 9. If 
W is set equal to c, then the opportunity cost test is essentially the same as 
before: Pv≥W+Cv. However, if W exceeds c, as is likely 10, then Pv may be 
less than W+Cv, but the vertically integrated firm may still be recovering its 
opportunity cost.  
                       
8 At the margin of the price change, the wholesale revenue foregone may be greater than the 
net revenue gained. This goes to the profit-maximization interpretation of the test. 
9 WEISMAN (2002) considers this case and also bypass under some simplified assumptions. 
10 Given the assumption of constant returns-to-scale, the regulator would need to ensure its 
estimate of costs did not accidentally fall below c, otherwise wholesaling would bankrupt the 
vertically integrated firm. This would also be so if the regulator allowed a contribution to shared 
costs (as is common, but not consistent with the simple case considered here of constant 
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Passage of the test, Pv≥W+Cv, is also no longer a sufficient, though it 
remains a necessary, condition for profit-maximization. With product 
differentiation, the profit-maximizing price would be marked-up above 
marginal opportunity cost (because firms face downward sloping retail 
demand curves), so P would be strictly greater than W+Cv. 
These results are summarized in Table 1, which illustrates what a 
particular test can demonstrate. Thus, the first column indicates that if 
Pv<W+Cv, then one cannot say whether the vertically integrated firm is 
covering its wholesaling opportunity cost, or if an efficient unintegrated firm 
can profitably supply the service. However, one can conclude that the 
vertically integrated firm is not maximizing profits. 
Table 1 - What a given test can demonstrate 
If:  Pv<W+Cv  Pv=W+Cv  Pv>W+Cv 
Wholesale opportunity cost is covered Not shown  Yes  Yes 
Efficient unintegrated firm is profitable Not shown  Not shown (Yes) 
(*) Not shown 
Behavior is profit-maximizing  No  No (Yes) 
(*) Not  shown 
(*) In the special case of contestability (which assumes no product differentiation), the elements 
in the column under Pv = W + Cv can be replaced with "Yes". This is so even with product 
differentiation, so long as there are no fixed costs. Then, if entry and exit are free (standard 
conditions of contestability), it is profit maximizing for the vertically integrated firm to set Pv = W 
+ Cv (the firm effectively faces a horizontal demand curve because customers could switch to an 
arbitrarily close differentiated service). At such prices, efficient unintegrated firms would cover 
costs, and outcomes would be efficient.  
As noted in section above, the assumption of product homogeneity is 
particularly inappropriate in the case of NGANs. 
Bypass and input substitution 
Similar results follow if there is wholesale product differentiation, or if 
bypass is possible, at the wholesale layer. In particular, focusing on bypass, 
if Pv<W+Cv, then an unintegrated firm may still profitably operate depending 
on its access to bypass. The outcome, however, may be inefficient, and 
could also harm competition. Equally, if Pv<W+Cv, then the vertically 
integrated firm's prices may still be covering its wholesaling opportunity 
costs, because an increase in its retail volumes may be accompanied by a 
smaller loss of wholesale volumes (due to bypass). However, it is unlikely 
that such a price could be profit maximizing, so the interpretations of the test 
(and the results that can be drawn from it) may go in opposite directions. 84     No. 78, 2
nd Q. 2010 
One-versus two-sided markets 
In an ordinary, or one-sided market, firms are best thought of as retailing 
to an end-user. However, in some markets, firms provide a platform that 
brings different groups of customers together to bring value to each "side" of 
the market. Such markets are called two-sided. NGAN providers, in 
supplying broadband, can be thought of as a platform that brings together 
content seekers (downloaders), who typically pay a monthly charge, and in 
some locations a per bit rate of some form, and content (including 
application) providers, some of whom pay for services, for example, that 
improve the speed that their content reaches the end-user  11. Content 
providers, in turn, typically deliver content seekers to advertisers. NGAN 
providers also link content providers to content seekers via subscription 
television, and here directly deal with advertisers as well. Moreover, they 
may also provide web content, again dealing directly with advertisers. 
Constructing imputation tests in such two-sided environments is 
challenging. Further, two-sided market issues are likely to be much more 
prevalent on NGANs than on copper networks (because broadband and 
subscription television services are likely to be of substantially more 
importance than traditional telephony). 
Two-sidedness also increases the possibilities for product differentiation 
by unintegrated carriers, by providing applications for content providers that 
ensure fast content delivery, or applications for end-users that are 
embedded with fast content delivery. For the reasons discussed above, this 
further complicates imputation test interpretation. 
   Summary 
In summary, imputation tests are difficult to implement, and without due 
care their results are misleading. This is especially so in an environment as 
complex as that of NGANs. Moreover, the cost of 'false positives' is likely to 
be high, supporting inefficiently high prices, and discouraging vertically 
integrated firms from vigorously competing. Consequently, imputation testing 
should not be applied prospectively to new tariffs. Rather, if price squeezes 
                       
11 Akamai is perhaps the preeminent third party provider of this kind of service, but carriers 
may also be well placed to compete in this market, especially on an NGAN. H. ERGAS, E. KODJO RALPH & E. LANIGAN  85 
are to be prosecuted, this should occur through the rigorous practice of 
competition law. That is, the situation with, as compared to without, the 
alleged anticompetitive behavior, should be shown to harm competition, and 
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